Several empirical studies of mergers and tender offers examine the changes in the value ownership claims associated with corporate acquisitions and use the observed value changes to address the degree of competition in the market for corporate acquisitions. These studies conclude that the takeover market is competitive on the basis of the abnormal stock price changes of bidding firms, the time series behavior of the market value of target firms, and the proportion of gains that accrue to target and bidding firms. Unfortunately, none of these tests are sufficient to conclude that the takeover market is competitive. A competitive acquisition market implies that the potential gain to unsuccessful bidders at the successful offer price is nonpositive. This implication is tested using data on tender offers in which there are multiple bidders. The results appear to be consistent with competition in the market for corporate acquisitions.
Introduction
Economists are concerned about competition in the corporate acquisition market for at least three reasons. First, perfect competition in the market for corporate acquisitions is often advanced as the solution to the conceptual problems associated with the separation of ownership and control.
In a competitive acquisitions market, firms that do not maximize market value are acquired and a value maximizing strategy is instituted. Second, a competitive acquisitions market assures efficient resource allocation. Since anti-trust laws presumably eliminate takeovers motivated by monopolization, efficient resource allocation occurs when assets are used in their highest valued application. Third, a competitive acquisitions market eliminates the need for securities regulations such as the Williams Act and state tender offer laws that "protect" target shareholders because the price of the target firm is bid up to its "fair value" in a competitive takeover market.
In spite of the importance of a competitive acquisitions market, the concept has not been defined in detail. The microeconomic definition of a competitive market focuses on firms which face infinitely elastic demand curves for homogeneous products. This definition does not apply to the takeover market because bidding and target firms are heterogeneous. In this paper competition in the acquisitions market is characterized in terms of the gain that accrues to potential bidding firms: in a competitive acquisitions market the price of the target firm rises until the acquisition is a negativê For example, see Manne (1965) , Smiley (1975) , and Fama (1978) . net present value investment for all unsuccessful bidders. This concept of a competitive acquisitions market captures the notion of rivalry among bidding firms. In this market, each potential bidder evaluates the target and advances a bid if it is advantageous to do so. This process continues and offer price is bid up until the takeover would be a negative net present value investment for the unsuccessful bidders. Since all firms, including firms which did not actually advance a bid, are potential bidders, the concept of a competitive takeover market means that even if only one bid is observed for a given target, the bid price ensures that no gains are available to any other potential bidder at the bid price.
The definition of a competition acquisitions market requires bidders to take advantage of all profitable takeover opportunities. The hypothesis of a competitive acquisitions market would be reject if positive net present value takeover bids are not advanced. This can occur for at least four reasons: bidders collude, unsuccessful bidders act irrationally, entry restrictions prohibit positive net present value bids, and strategic behavior by bidders.
If several bidders formed a cartel and only one member of the cartel bid for a given target, the exclusion of other members of the cartel could reduce the acquisition price. The value of target could exceed the acquisition price for non-bidding members of the cartel and thereby violating the condition for a competitive takeover market. Similarly governmental entry restrictions such as anti-trust laws could exclude firms which value the target firm more than the successful offer price.
-'-An example of this type of entry restriction is the Justice Department's request for additional information from Mobil during the Conoco takeover. This request prohibited Mobil from buying Conoco common stock and essentially prevented Mobil from actively competing with DuPont and Seagram even though Mobil's offer was the highest. See Ruback (1982) for additional information on this takeover.
Irrational behavior by bidding firms could also lead to rejection of the competitive acquisitions market hypothesis. Evidence presented in Dodd (1981) shows that the stock prices of successful bidding firms decline. This suggests that these bidders act irrationally by bidding too much for the target firms. This type of irrational behavior, however, is not inconsistent with the hypothesis since no restrictions are placed on the gains to successful bidders. The hypothesis is rejected if unsuccessful bidders do not match competing bids when the takeover would be a positive net present value investment at the higher price. This failure to make positive net present value takeovers could be due to either irrationality or strategic behavior by unsuccessful bidders. Strategic behavior occurs when bidders use information about other bidders to determine their takeover strategy. For example, suppose that firm U believes that a target is worth more to its rival bidder, firm S , than it is to firm U . Firm U could rationally choose not to bid because it believes firm S will be the successful acquirer. This behavior is inconsistent with the hypothesis of a competitive acquisitions market because the price of the target is not bid up until the takeover is a negative net present value investment for unsuccessful bidder.
Several empirical studies of mergers and tender offers examine the changes in the value of ownership claims associated with corporate acquisitions and use the observed value changes to address the degree of competition in the market for corporate acquisitions. Mandelker (1974) and Asquith (1982) He concludes that these results are consistent with competition in the acquisitions market since the acquired firms receive "the value of the asset bases under more efficient management." Ellert 's evidence is consistent with the payment of premiums by bidding firms, but does not imply a competitive acquisitions market because the hypothesis does not restrict the premium to be equal to the replacement cost of the target's assets.
Other authors, for example, Dodd and Ruback (1977) and Bradley (1980) examine the equity value changes associated with tender offers. These papers attempt to infer the degree of competition in the acquisitions market by noting that the positive abnormal return is higher for target firms than it is for bidding firms. In a competitive acquisition market, both bidding and target firms can realize positive abnormal returns. The definition of a competitive takeover market implies that the gains to the successful target are bounded by zero and the difference between the value of the target to the successful bidder and the target's next highest value use. The proportion of gains which accrue to the bidder and target, however, provides no basis for assessing competition in the acquisitions market since any split is feasible.
Competition in the takeover market cannot, in general, be assessed by examining the stock market reaction of the successful bidding and target firms. An alternative method of assessing competition in the acquisitions market, developed in Section 2, focuses on the potential gains to unsuccessful bidders from matching the successful offer price. Under the hypothesis of a competitive takeover market, this potential gain should be non-positive. The hypothesis is tested using a sample of 48 unsuccessful tender offers which is described in Section 3. The empirical results presented in Section 4 are consistent with a competitive takeover market.
A Procedure for Testing Competition in the Takeover Market
The test of competition in the acquisitions market examines the hypothesis that the successful bid price exhausts all potential gains for every unsuccessful bidder. The test therefore requires an estimate of the net present value of the acquisition for unsuccessful bidders at the successful offer price. While actual competition for a given target in the form of competing bids is not required by the definition of a competitive takeover market, these competing bids provide the basis for testing the hypothesis.
The potential gain for the unsuccessful bidder (firm u) from making a takeover offer at any given price i?^c an be measured as
iBasing the test on takeovers in which there are competing bids seems to bias the test in favor of the hypothesis since Fama and Laffer (1972 show that two noncolluding firms are sufficient for competition but one firm is not.
However, unless entry restrictions prohibit competing bids m uncontested takeovers, the lack of bids in uncontested tender offers does not indicate a lack of competition. Rather, it indicates that the initial offer price exhausted all potential gains for other bidders.
That is, the potential gain to firm u from making a bid of $P is the net present value of the takeover if it was successful at^P less the larger cash outflow from the higher offer price. For example, the gain from a successful offer at $P could be evaluated by estimating G (0) The market model (2) is estimated on 300 daily observations over the period 408 trading days before the takeover announcement through 108 days before the announcement.^T hese coefficient estimates are used to predict equilibrium returns around the announcement of a takeover and the prediction errors, (actual returns less predicted returns) proxy for abnormal returns.
Under the assumptions that the tender offer is unanticipated and the market presumes that the offer will be successful, the net present value of the offer is measured aŝ u^^u^=^t-1
here E is the equity value on the day before the announced offer and PE is the prediction error on the announcement day.
Previous empirical work indicates that the announcement of a tender offer is anticipated. For example, the results of Bradley (1980) suggests that information leakage regarding a tender offer occurs over the five days before the Wall Street Journal announcement. This leakage is incorporated into the analysis by summing the prediction errors over the period five days before the announcement through the announcement day. Defining this sum as CPE^_^^^, the cumulative prediction error from t-5 through t , the gain is estimated as
Since the last trades of common stocks occur at different times, nonsychronous trading problems are present in daily stock return data. Scholes and Williams (1977) show that this causes bias in market model coefficients and present efficient estimators of the coefficients. This paper uses these efficient coefficient estimators.
A remaining difficulty in measuring the potential gains for unsuccessful bidders is that it is unlikely that the market presumes that every tender offer will be successful. The abnormal change in equity values, therefore, measures the expected gain to the bidder. Defining it as the s probability that a given offer will be successful, and abstracting from transactions costs, the measured change in equity values is.
E^, • CPE^_^=^G (P )
. (5) t-6 t-5,t s u u
Substituting the value of G (P ) in (5) into (1) yields positive and inconsistent with the hypothesis. These critical values can be calculated from (6).
Data
The test of rivalry in the acquisitions market requires competing bids for target firms. The empirical tests, therefore, examine interfirm tender offers. These data are particularly well suited for this test because the competitive bidding is accomplished by the public announcements of offers.
The data are derived from the tender offer samples used in Dodd and Ruback (1977) , Bradley (1980) and 14D-1 filings published in the SEC News Digest .
The following criteria are used to select a subset of tender offers which are appropriate for this application:
1) There must be at least two bidders for the same target;
2) The tender offer must be for control of the target; (ED) these bidding firms earn 0.14 percent which is also insignificantly different from zero. The data in Table 1 indicate that, on average, no abnormal returns are associated with unsuccessful takeover bids. This result, while obstensibly consistent with the announcement month 0.6 percent abnormal return for unsuccessful bidders reported in Dodd and Ruback (1977) , is somewhat surprising. Studies of mergers by Dodd (1981) and Asquith (1982) indicate that the announcement day abnormal returns for successful and unsuccessful bidders are similar. This suggests that the market does not distinguish between successful and unsuccessful offers until the post-announcement information regarding the outcome of the offer is released. Since Dodd and Ruback (1977) use monthly data, it is likely that some of the post-announcement information is incorporated into their event month abnormal return. The anticipated pattern of daily abnormal returns in Table 1 , therefore, is a positive prediction error on the event day since Dodd and Ruback (1977) , Kummer and Hoffmeister (1978) and Bradley (1980) report positive abnormal returns for successful bidders and negative abnormal returns following the announcement as the information about the outcome of the offer is released. Instead of this anticipated pattern, Table 1 indicates that no significant abnormal returns 4he t-statistlcs are calculated as:
where T = t2 -ti + 1 • The covariance term in the measure of the standard deviation adjusts for the first order serial dependence in the average prediction errors from the Scholes and Williams Market Model. The variance and covariance of the prediction errors are estimated using 48 prediction errors over the period t-l08 through t-61.
are associated with either the announcement of the offer or the subsequent failure of the offer. -ED is the day on which the tender offer was announced in the Wall Street Journal. Table 2 Frequency The event period is defined as ED-5 through ED, where ED is the day on which the tender offer was announced in the Wall Street Journal.
A Test of Competition in the Takeover Market
Competition in the acquisition market implies that the price of the target firm rises until it is a non-positive net present value investment for all unsuccessful bidders. Using the methodology described in Section 2, the potential gain from matching the successful offer price is estimated for each of the 48 unsuccessful bidders in the sample. The average potential gain is -$195 million and the average t-statistic is -9.11. These results are consistent with competition in the takeover market since the potential gains are significantly less than zero. However, these results are not sufficient to conclude that the data are consistent with a competitive takeover market for two reasons. First, the average potential gain could be dominated by a few observations. Second, as indicated in Section 2, the potential gain is calculated under the assumption that the market anticipates that each offer will be successful. Table 3 presents the results in more detail. Recall from Section 2 that when the abnormal change in equity value is negative, the observation is unambiguously consistent with competition in the takeover market. The upper right hand cell of Table 3 indicates that 29 observations fall into this category. For these 29 bids the initial market reaction is negative implying that the offer was not, ex ante, a positive net present value investment.
Nevertheless, since these bidders abandoned their offers instead of matchinĝ
The standard deviation for the potential gain is estimated as:
where T is the length of the cummulation interval (six days) and the variance and covariance of the prediction errors are estimated using 48 prediction errors over the period t-l08 through t-61. For 6 offers the abnormal change In the unsuccessful bidder's equity value exceeded the difference between the successful and unsuccessful offer price (upper left hand cell of Table 3 ). These observations are unambiguously inconsistent with a competitive takeover market: in these 6 observations the unsuccessful bidders did not match the successful offer price even though the data indicate that the takeover would have been a positive net present value investment at the successful offer price. The successful offer price, therefore, did not exhaust the potential gain for the unsuccessful bidders.
In 13 observations the abnormal change in equity value for the unsuccessful bidder is positive, but less than the difference between the successful and unsuccessful offer prices. If the abnormal changes in equity value correctly measures the net present value of the takeover at the unsuccessful offer price, that is, if the ex ante probability of success was unity, these observations are consistent with a competitive acquisitions market. However, if the probability of success was not unity, the measured change in equity value underestimates the net present value of the unsuccessful offer. Thus, there is a sufficiently small value of the probability of success that would make G (P ) positive and inconsistent us with a competitive acquisitions market. The critical value of the ex ante -^If the ex-ante probability of success for these offers was less than one, the abnormal change in equity value underestimates the gain from the acquisition making the observations even more inconsistent with a competitive takeover market. probability of success, equates G (P ) to zero and is calculated using (6). Table 4 presents the frequency distribution of the critical values of the probability of success. All of the 13 observations are consistent with competition in the takeover market if the ex-ante probability of success exceeds 50 percent and 9 observations are consistent with competition for ex-ante probabilities of success above 25 percent. While there is no method to extract a measure of the probability of success for a given tender offer, the proportion of successful and unsuccessful offers reported in Dodd and Ruback (1977) suggests that the unconditional probability of success is about 0.72. It seems plausible to assume, therefore, that firms do not announce tender offers unless the probability of success is at least 50 percent. Under this assumption, all 13 of these observations are consistent with competition in the takeover market.
In summary, the results appear to be consistent with competition in the takeover market. On average, the successful offer price exhausts the potential gains for unsuccessful bidders. Furthermore, 88 percent of the individual observations are consistent with competition in the takeover market. In the 48 unsuccessful tender offers examined, 29 are unambiguously consistent with competition, 13 are consistent with competition if the probability of success exceeds 50 percent and only 6 observations are unambiguously inconsistent with competition. Thus, it appears that the market for corporate acquisitions is competitive. 
